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1. Introduction
Complexities of corporate groups play a role in nearly every 
restructuring or insolvency case. However, legislators pay 
only limited attention to the group context. This may be 
surprising, as the phenomenon of corporate groups is noth-
ing new. The current state of law results in cases where a 
strong economic unity (enterprise) is legally considered 
only as a conglomerate of separate entities. Once insolvent, 
such entities are treated separately in the course of insol-
vency proceedings.
The issue of restructuring in corporate groups was discus-
sed at two conferences that took place on 5 and 11 Decem-
ber 2018. The first one was jointly organised in Leiden (The 
Netherlands) by the European Law Institute (ELI)2 and the 
Business & Liability Research Network (BLRN)3. During this 
conference developments at both the national and European 
level were extensively discussed. The second conference of 
ELI took place in Vienna and focussed on the topic of sub-
stantive consolidation in insolvency. The starting point for 
both discussions were the recommendations of the ELI In-
strument on Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (ELI Busi-
ness Rescue Instrument).
This article provides an overview of the discussions that 
took place during these conferences. We will consecutive-
ly discuss the ELI Business Rescue Project (§2), and more 
specifically its recommendations on corporate groups (§3). 
Then, we will elaborate on certain aspects of directors’ 
duties in corporate groups (§4), and options for dealing 
effectively with the insolvency of corporate groups (§5). 
1 Please quote this article as: J.M.G.J. Boon, I. Kokorin & J.M.W. Pool, ‘Im-
proving Restructuring of Corporate Groups in Europe’, TvI 2019/. Gert-Jan, 
Ilya and Jessie are researchers at the Leiden University. Gert-Jan was also 
a member of the Project Team for the ELI Business Rescue Project. The au-
th ors can be contacted at: j.m.g.j.boon@law.leidenuniv.nl, i.kokorin@law.
leidenuniv.nl, and j.m.w.pool@law.leidenuniv.nl. 
2 The ELI is founded in June 2011 as an entirely independent organisation. 
The ELI aims to improve the quality of European law, understood in the 
broadest sense. It seeks to initiate, conduct and facilitate research, to 
make recommendations, and to provide practical guidance in the field of 
European legal development. For more information, see: www.european-
lawinstitute.eu.
3 BLRN is a multidisciplinary research and expertise network that focuses 
on a variety of aspects of doing business within the context of company 
and insolvency law. It is a collaboration of the departments of Company 
Law and Business Studies of the Leiden University. Good corporate gover-
nance, future business structures and distress & insolvency are the key 
areas of attention. For more information, see: www.universiteitleiden.nl/
en/law/business-liability-research-network.
This is followed by the Belgian approach to restructuring of 
corporate groups (§6). Subsequently, we will report on the 
issue of substantive consolidation (§7), which is followed by 
a conclusion (§8).
2. The ELI Business Rescue Project
At the conference in Leiden, Prof. Em. Bob Wessels (Leiden 
University, The Netherlands) introduced the background, 
scope and results of the ELI Business Rescue Project. He ela-
borated that the European Commission has aimed, among 
other things, to harmonise insolvency laws and provide 
viable businesses in financial difficulties an opportunity 
for early restructuring. With these developments in mind, 
the Business Rescue Project was initiated by ELI in 2013, di-
rected at designing a set of norms and requirements that 
should enable further development of coherent and func-
tional rules for restructuring of distressed businesses in Eu-
rope. Reporters for the project were Bob Wessels and Prof. 
Stephan Madaus (Martin Luther University, Germany).4 
Based primarily on detailed national and international 
inventory reports, the ELI Business Rescue Instrument 
was drafted.5 It comprises 115 recommendations on a legal 
framework enabling the development of coherent and func-
tional rules for business rescue in Europe.
3. Recommendations on restructuring of 
corporate groups in Europe
Madaus elaborated on the recommendations made in the 
ELI Business Rescue Instrument on the issue of corporate 
groups. Insolvency of (parts of) a corporate group may fur-
ther complicate things, as many jurisdictions apply a strict 
individualistic treatment of the insolvent group members 
(entity-by-entity approach). The structure of the group gets 
lost when insolvency proceedings are commenced, since in 
many cases the approach is directed at only one insolvent 
debtor, involving one estate, one insolvency proceeding, one 
court and one insolvency practitioner (IP). When there is no 
coordination between different insolvency proceedings of 
companies belonging to the same group, there may be a loss 
of group synergies.
4 For an introduction on the ELI Business Rescue Project, see also: Gert-Jan 
Boon, Jan Adriaanse & Margot Branger, ‘Business Rescue’, TvI 2018/21. See 
also:  https://europeanlawinstitute.eu/projects-publications/completed-
projects/insolvency/.
5 Bob Wessels & Stephan Madaus, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law – an 
Instrument of the European Law Institute (September 6, 2017). Available at 
SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3032309.
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To deal with corporate groups, different approaches have 
been developed, both in theory and in practice. They provi-
de for different levels of coordination and consolidation but 
aim to improve the outcomes for corporate groups. Madaus 
distinguished between six different approaches, characteri-
sed by the increasing degree of coordination/consolidation:
1. Coordination: coordination between the involved 
courts and IPs;
2. Coordination + coordination proceedings: this includes 
(i) coordination between the involved courts and IP, 
and (ii) the introduction of a proceeding aimed at facili-
tating the needed coordination, possibly by appointing 
a group coordinator;
3. Procedural consolidation 1: appointment of the same IP 
in all insolvency proceedings;
4. Procedural consolidation 2: this includes (i) appoint-
ment of the same IP in all insolvency proceedings and 
(ii) appointment of the same judge(s) in those proceed-
ings (this may require the implementation of the con-
cept of Enterprise COMI);
5. Procedural consolidation 3: this provides for one re-
structuring plan for all members of the corporate 
group; and
6. Substantial consolidation: this provides for a common 
estate for all insolvent members of the corporate group.
The results of the Business Rescue Project show converging 
approaches across Europe. Many times, there are no specific 
rules for dealing with corporate groups, although in practice 
pragmatic approaches have been pursued. Some countries 
allow for some levels of coordination and procedural con-
solidation. Substantive consolidation is allowed in excep-
tional cases of irreversibly intermingled assets and/or fraud. 
The ELI Business Rescue Instrument contains 12 recom-
mendations on corporate groups. In brief, it is recommen-
ded for national legislators to create a legal framework for 
dealing with insolvent corporate groups (Recommendation 
9.01). Courts are advised to consider whether a coordinated 
strategy is possible, before opening insolvency proceedings 
with regard to a member of a corporate group (Recommen-
dation 9.02). The EU and national legislators should ensure 
that courts and IPs are guided by principles and guidelines 
on cooperation and communication, including the CoCo 
Guidelines (2007),6 and the EU JudgeCo Principles and 
Guidelines (Recommendation 9.03).7 This should also ap-
ply when an international insolvency case falls outside the 
scope of the EIR 2015 (Recommendation 9.04). Coordination 
proceedings should be made more efficient, for instance, 
Member States should enable joint opening of insolvency 
proceedings when the centres of main interests (COMIs) of 
the members of the group are located in their jurisdiction 
(Recommendations 9.05 and 9.06), and consider the role of 
6 European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border 
Insolvency, 2007.
7 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles of 
2015, which include also the EU JudgeCo Guidelines, 2015.
the IP in group insolvency proceedings (Recommendation 
9.07). 
In addition, whereas participation in group coordination 
proceedings is voluntary, an explicit decision should be 
required for group members that wish to opt-out (Recom-
mendation 9.08). Furthermore, solvent group members 
must be allowed to join group coordination proceedings 
without subjecting themselves to a court or the insolvency 
proceedings (Recommendation 9.09). In addition, the group 
restructuring plan should be binding for its participating 
members (Recommendation 9.10). For domestic corporate 
groups, the EU and national legislators should promote the 
appointment of the same IP in the insolvency proceedings 
of different group members (Recommendation 9.11). Also, 
substantive consolidation should be available, but limited to 
a single jurisdiction and for cases of intermingled assets or 
fraud only (Recommendation 9.12).
4. Director’s duties in corporate groups
The role of directors’ duties in the context of (insolvent) cor-
porate groups was discussed by Prof. Reinout Vriesendorp 
(Leiden University, The Netherlands). In the Netherlands, as 
in various other jurisdictions, the interests to be considered 
by directors of a group member differ depending on the po-
sition of that member within the group. At the group level 
(TopCo), the parent’s interests must be considered as being 
equal to the interests of the entire group. This involves the 
interests of the group as a whole. However, for operational 
companies (OpCo), directors must consider the specific in-
terest of the respective OpCo. 
The relevant duties also depend largely on the extent to 
which the activities and processes of a group are integrated. 
When there is a high degree of integration, e.g. for highly in-
tegrated companies as was the case with Lehmann Brothers 
or Parmalat, the OpCo’s cannot act independently. This is 
different when OpCo’s are loosely related, act independent-
ly within the group and are not dependent on other group 
members for their individual viability.
The EU proposal for Preventive Restructuring Directive 
(Proposal)8 states that directors, when insolvency is loom-
ing, should take appropriate action. The scope of provisions 
of the Proposal on this matter has varied in subsequent ver-
sions, in particular, regarding Article 18 and Recital 36 of 
8 At the time of the conference the most recent version of the Proposal was: 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to 
increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge proce-
dures and amending Directive 2012/30 – General approach of 1 October 
2018, 12536/18, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/docu-
ment/ST-12536-2018-INIT/en/pdf.
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the Proposal.9 In discussions on these parts of the Proposal, 
it has been argued that the complexity of directors’ duties 
may lead to extensive legal proceedings.
Potential conflicts of interests of directors may come in play 
when directors of OpCo’s or a HoldCo must also take into ac-
count the group’s interests. For instance, when entering into 
contracts without clear outcomes, when making payments 
or contributions to the parent or other group entities that 
deplete the company’s assets, when collecting intercom-
pany claims, or where the parent also acts as board of a sub-
sidiary. Interdependency may guide directors in their focus 
on individual or corporate benefit. To this end, Vriesendorp 
presents several points of reference for the director: Is there 
commingling of assets and/or administration? Based on an 
‘independent viability test’, can the group member survive 
without the group or the parent? Other points of reference 
can be whether there has been voluntary consolidation by 
providing an under Dutch law so-called ‘403 Declaration’?10 
Has the company attracted contractual, non-delictual lia-
bility? Finally, depending on the type of company creditors 
have been contracting with, what is the reasonable expec-
tation of creditors?
5. Reviewing options for dealing with 
corporate groups
  Evaluating the existing legal mechanisms to 
facilitate efficient resolution of corporate groups 
in distress
Jessie Pool (researcher at Leiden University) discussed the 
difficulties of dealing with corporate groups. She consid-
ered that the most probable solution under the EIR 2015, co-
operation and communication, face significant limitations. 
First, the EIR 2015 provides for the obligation of actors (IPs 
and courts) involved in insolvency proceedings of corpora-
te groups to cooperate and communicate. Notwithstanding 
the obvious advantages of this duty, several difficulties have 
been identified. The duty, for instance, only applies when 
cooperation and communication are appropriate to facili-
tate the effective administration of these proceedings, are 
compatible with the rules applicable to such proceedings 
(lex concursus), and when it does not entail any conflict of 
interests. Pool argues that, although the duty to cooperate 
9 This has been revised in the agreement on the Proposal that was reached 
by the Council and the European Parliament on 17 December 2018. A revi-
sed Article 18 was included again, which reads as follows: “Member States 
shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, directors, as a 
minimum, have due regard to the following: 
(b) the interests of creditors, other stakeholders and equity holders; 
(c) the need to take steps to avoid insolvency; and 
(d) the need to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that threatens 
the viability of the business.”
See: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to 
increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge proce-
dures and amending Directive 2012/30 - Confirmation of the final com-
promise text with a view to agreement of 17 December 2018, 15556/18, 
available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15556-
2018-INIT/en/pdf.
10 See Article 2:403 Dutch Civil Code.
and communicate is a valuable mechanism, it may not have 
the desired effect. This is due to exceptions offered by the 
EIR 2015 that allows courts and insolvency practitioners to 
deviate from this duty. Second, despite the promising tools 
offered by the provisions on coordination, group coordina-
tion proceedings are strictly voluntary. Third, Pool observes 
that both the EIR 2015 promotes procedural cooperation 
and coordination, instead of cross-border procedural or 
substantive consolidation, which in some cases may be a 
more effective and efficient approach for corporate groups.
Pool subsequently discussed several solutions that have 
been offered in literature. Courts may consider appointment 
of the same IP in the insolvency proceedings of all insolvent 
members of a corporate group.11 However, this approach 
overlooks the potential conflict of interests between mem-
bers of the corporate group and between their creditors. 
This conflict of interests may preclude the appointment of 
the same insolvency practitioner in the proceedings of all 
corporate groups. Also, several practical difficulties may 
arise (for instance regarding different languages and cul-
tures). Furthermore, to be appointed as an insolvency practi-
tioner, Member States must recognise the qualifications of 
the insolvency practitioner in another jurisdiction. 
Another solution may be the use of an Enterprise COMI 
(E-COMI). Under this approach, the COMI of a subsidiary 
may be identical with the COMI of the parent company, thus 
enabling one court to open insolvency proceedings of all 
members of the corporate group. E-COMI is a type of pro-
cedural consolidation that allows for the administration of 
different insolvency procedures in a single forum. It allows 
for better coordination and avoids at least some transaction 
costs. Notwithstanding the advantages of the E-COMI ap-
proach, following the judgement in Eurofood, the COMI of a 
subsidiary is not at its own registered office only if the fac-
tors showing that the subsidiary's COMI is located at the re-
gistered office of the parent company are objective and as-
certainable by third parties. Pool argues that the judgement 
in Eurofood impedes the practical usability and impact of 
the E-COMI approach.
  Reinventing synthetic proceedings in corporate 
group insolvencies
Ilya Kokorin (researcher at Leiden University) addressed 
the issue of ‘synthetic’ insolvency proceedings under the 
EIR 2015. Having stressed the somewhat limited scope of 
new provisions on group coordination proceedings, Kokorin 
highlighted the existence of another potentially powerful, 
but largely underused tool of the EIR Recast, namely syn-
thetic or ‘as if’ proceedings. Originating from judicial inno-
vativeness, such proceedings have now been entrenched in 
Article 36 EIR 2015. This article introduces a legal regime for 
the avoidance of secondary insolvency proceedings, based 
11 Advocates of this solution are C.G. Paulus, Überlegungen zu einem mo-
dernen Konzerninsolvenzrecht, ZAP 44/2005, p. 1948-1955 and N.W.A. 
Tollenaar, ‘Dealing with the insolvency of multinational groups under the 
European Insolvency Regulation’, TvI 2010/14, (p. 94).
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on the unilateral promise (undertaking) given by the main 
IP to local creditors, guaranteeing that the latter will receive 
treatment ‘as if’ the secondary proceedings have actually 
been opened.
Despite obvious advantages (coordination of restructuring 
efforts and decrease in transaction costs), ‘traditional’ syn-
thetic proceedings remain ill equipped for insolvencies of 
corporate groups. After all, in order to reap the benefits of 
such proceedings in a group context, the COMIs of all group 
members have to be in the same jurisdiction. Thus, unless 
a miracle happens, the use of synthetic proceedings will 
not bring centralisation of insolvency proceedings opened 
against group members. The question arises whether the 
logic behind synthetic proceedings can be adapted to avoid 
multiplication of insolvency proceedings and to pull insol-
vency proceedings of group members in one jurisdiction. 
Kokorin gives an affirmative answer on this question, in-
spired by the recent judgment in In the Matter of Videology 
Ltd [2018] EWHC 2186 and the UNCITRAL’s draft Model Law 
on Enterprise Group Insolvency. He suggests using the com-
panies’ establishments as a linking jurisdictional factor, 
instead of a more rigid concept of COMI. In contrast with 
‘traditional’ synthetic proceedings, in the offered scenario, 
it is the main insolvency proceedings that may be avoided 
to facilitate the desired jurisdictional concentration. As a 
result, insolvency proceedings of group members can be 
initiated in a single jurisdiction (COMI- and establishment-
linked), while additional proceedings in other jurisdictions 
are avoided. Despite clear attractiveness of this solution, 
Kokorin considers it to be unavailable under current rules of 
the EIR 2015, which provide only for the exclusion of secon-
dary proceedings (see Article 36 EIR 2015).
  Using insolvency protocols in the context of 
corporate groups
Gert-Jan Boon (researcher at Leiden University) discussed 
the potential and practice of using insolvency protocols 
to improve coordination and cooperation in international 
insolvencies of members of corporate groups. Compared to 
other options, insolvency protocols are included as an op-
tion in the EIR 2015, both for individual insolvent debtors as 
well as for corporate groups. However, Boon argues that the 
EIR 2015 leaves much room for interpretation, which may 
limit their effectiveness in practice.
In general, protocols are used between insolvency practi-
tioners (and courts) to lay down specific agreements on 
cooperation and coordination. Insolvency protocols have 
received attention by various international standard-
setting organisations that developed soft law instruments. 
They highlight that at a minimum, protocols should provide 
for coordinated court approvals and communication with 
creditors resulting in timesaving and – also for corporate 
groups – contribute to maximising the value of the estate(s). 
Protocols do not make clear what their legal status is, more 
specifically: Are they binding, or do they create (at least) a 
moral duty? What is the applicable law? What is the role of 
courts and creditors regarding a protocol? Although provi-
ding for them, the EIR 2015 in Recital 49 and Articles 56 and 
57 generally describes protocols as an option too, that can 
be written or oral, may be varying in scope and lacks a mini-
mum standard. Also, it is unclear how often they are used in 
practice as they are usually not published.
Boon suggests that protocols have potential but would be-
nefit from further research. Existing soft law instruments, 
including from UNCITRAL, provide a valuable point of ref-
erence. To promote broader use of protocols, consideration 
may be given to a modular approach offering different mo-
dels depending, for instance, on the size or sector of the 
corporate group. This may limit the time and costs for ne-
gotiating the protocol, but also function as a helpful point of 
reference and possibly benchmark for judges.
6. Restructuring Corporate Groups in Belgian 
Insolvency Law
Prof. Joeri Vananroye (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Bel-
gium) introduced the Belgian framework for dealing with 
insolvent corporate groups.12 The Belgian law contains only 
a few provisions that address (the insolvency of members 
of) corporate groups. In principle, the law treats companies 
on an entity-by-entity basis. The rules on limited liability of 
individual legal entities apply to the individual members of 
a group, with only some exceptions, such as with liability 
of shareholders in case of single shareholder companies. 
For instance, a shareholder may risk liability when acting 
as de facto director and for manifestly serious wrongdoings 
that contributed to the insolvency of the company. A share-
holder, in his capacity, does not have specific duties of care 
and there is no higher threshold than is the case for other 
parties.
For many years, the issue of corporate groups was practi-
cally ignored in Belgium. However, the Belgian legislator 
implemented the provisions on corporate groups of the EIR 
2015 in Book XX of the Belgian Code on Economic Law. The-
se provisions have been extended to include non-EU com-
panies. For domestic groups, Belgian law provides that the 
COMI of the parent can also be the COMI of all its insolvent 
group members. This also allows for the appointment of the 
same IP for each insolvent member of the corporate group. 
This procedural consolidation has been made possible for 
domestic groups as of 1 May 2018.13
Furthermore, group structures may be used for (strategic) 
asset partitioning. When this is pursued in the vicinity of 
insolvency, it may be declared voidable with an actio pauli-
12 The presentation is also available here: https://limo.libis.be/primo-explore/
fulldisplay?docid=LIRIAS2342833&context=L&vid=Lirias&search_scope=
Lirias&tab=default_tab&lang=en_US. 
13 Art. XX.13 Belgian Code on Economic Law, it reads (translated in English): 
Art. XX. 13. The court with jurisdiction over an insolvency proceeding 
concerning an undertaking has jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings 
concerning an undertaking affiliated with this undertaking. It can assign a 
common insolvency practitioner for all proceedings.
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ana. Creditors or the insolvency practitioner can also invoke 
the actio pauliana outside the zone of insolvency, when fa-
ced with the transfer of value that could not be taken in the 
interest of the company. For those two cases, it is required 
that the creditor is harmed due to the contested transac-
tion. A remaining option is a special feature under Belgian 
law, the so-called auto-cession. When a company enters ju-
dicial reorganisation proceedings, the aim is to sell (a part 
of) the business to a new company. Many times the bid is 
made by insiders (for instance, shareholders or directors), 
which is called an auto-cession. These insider sales are allo-
wed under certain conditions. Article XX.87 §2 of the Code 
on Economic Law provides in those cases:
‘the offer can only be taken into account if such rights are 
made accessible to other bidders under the same terms 
and conditions.’
This rule aims to create a level playing field for all interested 
parties in a judicial reorganisation.
The (new) rules in Belgium provide for more opportunities 
to restructure distressed corporate groups by providing for 
better opportunities to facilitate preservation of the going-
concern value. In a strongly integrated and inter-woven 
group, this going-concern value may be perceived as a joint 
asset of the group as a whole. Currently, this going-concern 
value is invoked to justify a transfer of value. Joeri suggests 
that we might consider applying this also more generally as 
an asset of the corporate group, for which the directors have 
a duty to safeguard this common going concern value, also 
in case of insolvency.
7. Consolidated treatment of insolvent 
corporate groups
A week later, on the occasion of the 54th session of the 
UNCITRAL Working Group V meeting in Vienna, ELI organ-
ised a discussion on using substantive consolidation to deal 
with insolvent corporate groups. Madaus chaired the ses-
sion, and emphasised the need for having separate corpo-
rate entities, for instance, to allow businesses to shift their 
risks. Still, businesses must abide and respect the pari passu 
principle in insolvency. Central question during the discus-
sion was whether there would also be room for substantive 
and/or procedural consolidation.
  The European Union Perspective
Florian Bruder (DLA Piper, Germany) elaborated that under 
the EIR 2015 there is no room for substantive consolidation. 
It has been a deliberate choice to exclude this in Chapter 5 
of the EIR 2015 dealing with corporate groups. In practice, 
the solution is to pursue maximum cooperation and com-
munication, up to the extent it is not incompatible with 
(local) procedural rules. In particular, insolvency protocols 
may be used, also – as is possible in Germany – to grant the 
insolvency practitioner with extra powers.
The group coordination procedure in the EIR 2015 contains 
procedural rules on coordination of insolvency proceedings 
of members of a corporate group. Group coordination pro-
ceedings are flexible in the sense that it is possible to opt-
out from and (subsequently) opt-in such proceeding. Also, 
the resulting group coordination plan is not binding. Fur-
ther consolidation is prohibited under Article 71 of the EIR 
2015. In practice, the debtor will try to prevent insolvency 
proceedings, or, when that is not possible, aim for a single 
point of entry by focusing on the HoldCo insolvency proceed-
ing. A next step would be to resolve matters that deal with 
third party security.
If this would not work out and multiple proceedings would 
be opened, the aim would be, first, to concentrate the 
COMI of the involved group members. However, under the 
EIR 2015 it has become increasingly time consuming and 
uncertain to concentrate the COMIs. German law helps the 
insolvency practitioner by stating that when one member of 
a corporate group has filed for the commencement of insol-
vency proceedings at one court, other group members with 
their COMI in Germany may, under certain conditions, ap-
ply for insolvency proceedings with that same court. Where 
there would (still) be multiple judges and/or insolvency 
practitioners involved, it is important to pursue cooperation 
and communication.
Another option is to proceed with synthetic secondary 
proceedings, however, the EIR 2015 allows this only for se-
condary proceedings, not for corporate groups. In addition, 
debtor in possession proceedings may be considered as a 
way to promote treatment of enterprise group members.
  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part three:
treatment of enterprise groups
Prof. Irit Mevorach (University of Nottingham, UK) spoke on 
the role of consolidation as promoted by UNCITRAL in its 
third part of the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2010). 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide Part Three promotes 
the use of substantive consolidation, but, according to 
Mevorach, this should not be seen as a one-size-fits-all tool. 
The Legislative Guide considers several types of proceedings 
and tools to deal with corporate groups, including: (i) joint 
application, (ii) procedural coordination, (iii) post-commence-
ment finance, (iv) avoidable transactions, (v) substantive 
consolidation, (vi) appointment of the same insolvency re-
presentative, (vii) coordination of reorganisation plans, and 
(viii) international aspects. Substantive consolidation is de-
fined as: 
‘the treatment of the assets and liabilities of two or more 
enterprise group members as if they were part of a single 
insolvency estate’.14 
14 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part three: treatment of enterprise groups, 
Glossary, at 4(e).
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Recommendation 219 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
emphasises the principles of separate legal entity. Recom-
mendation 220 makes an exemption on this, to apply sub-
stantive consolidation, in case of intermingled assets or 
fraud. This is further discussed in Recommendations 221-
231, which make it clear that substantive consolidation is 
not a one size fits all, and may be applied partially to an 
insolvent corporate group.
Mevorach argues that UNCITRAL has found the right bal-
ance between the principles of company law and insolvency 
law. In the extreme, under company law a separate entity 
approach would apply, meaning members of the corporate 
group would always be treated on an entity-by-entity basis. 
It recognises the corporate personality and limited liability 
of the entities. It also provides room for asset partitioning. 
Under insolvency law, the enterprise approach would pre-
vail. It focuses on maximising asset value, equitable treat-
ment of creditors and timely resolution of insolvency. This 
allows better chances of addressing problems of fraud. 
When the corporate group is centrally controlled and or-
ganised, we must give more consideration to the group as 
a whole. Substantive consolidation can fulfil the goal of 
insolvency with respect to asset partitioning and inter-
mingling of assets. According to Mevorach, the corporate 
form was – as one could also say – already ignored before 
the group went insolvent. Furthermore, with fraud it should 
always be possible to opt for substantive consolidation. 
  The US perspective on substantive consolidation
Prof. Edward Janger (Brooklyn Law School, USA) mentioned 
a paper of Bill Widen in which he pointed out that substan-
tive consolidation is quite common for corporate groups in 
the US.15 However, the US follows the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide Part Three. According to the Legislative Guide, the US 
insolvency laws respect the corporate form, an exception is 
made only in Recommendations 219 and 220.
  Substantive consolidation: the practical approach
From this point of view, the observation of Bill Widen rai-
ses questions, like: When does substantive consolidation 
happen? Does substantive consolidation imply pari passu 
treatment of creditors? Are pre-insolvency priorities recon-
stituted under a restructuring plan when substantive con-
solidation is applied? Janger mentions that substantive con-
solidation takes place mostly in the context of consensual 
(restructuring) plans. In practice, it is not often formally 
approved, but performed when there are no objections to 
it. Therefore, it is not applied until there is a restructuring 
plan. In the restructuring plan, parties agree on substantial 
consolidation, which takes place under certain safeguards. 
The restructuring plan can consolidate the members of the 
corporate group, but the creditors remain separately clas-
sified for the purpose of voting and distribution. It is a prac-
tical way of respecting the corporate form.
15 William H. Widen, ‘Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation’, 75 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev.237 (2007), at 309.
In a consensual restructuring plan, there are procedural 
protections for, for instance, matters of classification of 
creditors, disclosure, solicitation and voting. Furthermore, 
for substantive matters, there is a best interests test. In 
the specific context of corporate groups, we may consider 
what would happen without any consolidation. In addition, 
cram-down may be applied, but this can be complex.
  A formal versus the practical waterfall for a 
corporate group
Traditionally, in distributing assets of a corporate group, 
the so-called formal ‘waterfall’ is followed to address indi-
vidual entitlements on: (i) liened assets, and (ii) realisable 
value traceable to specific group members and their claims. 
Based on the entity-by-entity approach, the aim would be 
to attribute assets to the individual member of the group 
and from there to the respective creditors. This also allows 
for structural subordination of specific claims and for asset 
partitioning. The remaining assets are divided among the 
remaining creditors on a pari passu basis. In this rather 
hierarchical approach, the entitlements are at the top and 
the pari passu principle is effectively at the bottom for the 
remaining creditors only. Much time and effort will be in-
vested in allocating assets to the right entity within a group.
Another approach is proposed by Janger, which he refers to 
as the practical waterfall. It is designed to help those insol-
vent corporate groups, such as with Nortel, where there is 
a lot of value, but no clear distribution rules as it is hard to 
ascertain to which entity and within which jurisdiction the 
specific value belongs. Janger suggests taking firm value as 
a starting point, which in principle will be shared pari pas-
su among all creditors of the corporate group. An exception 
is made for certain creditors where it can be proved that 
they have priority. This would, for instance, be the case of a 
lien, security interest, but also the realisable value of parti-
tioned assets. The benefit of such an approach aligns better 
and deals more efficiently with the practical situation of a 
corporate group, with a group of assets on the one hand and 
many claims on the other hand.
8. Conclusion
At the conferences organised in December 2018 in Leiden 
and Vienna restructuring of corporate groups was dis-
cussed. The starting point was the ELI Business Rescue In-
strument of 2017 that gave recommendations also on the 
treatment of corporate groups. As Madaus highlighted, 
theoretically, different approaches can be distinguished 
from limited coordination up until full substantive consoli-
dation. Insolvent members of corporate groups in Europe 
are traditionally treated on an entity-by-entity basis. Other 
than the EIR 2015, domestic rules on corporate groups are 
limited in EU member states. Vananroye, who elaborated 
on the possibilities under Belgian law, also illustrated this. 
As highlighted by Vriesendorp, further research may con-
sider the role of directors of (imminent) insolvent corporate 
groups in the European context.
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The discussions have shown that approaches for restructu-
ring of corporate groups are still very much in development, 
also within the European context. To date, there are no ex-
periences yet with the group coordination proceedings un-
der the EIR 2015. The use of other tools – such as insolvency 
protocols – is also not yet a typical practice across Europe. 
In a cross-border European setting, but also domestically, 
improving coordination by means of cooperation and com-
munication by insolvency practitioners and courts may be 
the most feasible direction to pursue now. To this end, jud-
ges and practitioners may rely on recommendations and 
best practices, for instance the ELI Business Rescue Instru-
ment, but also those from other standard-setting organi-
sations – both domestically and internationally – that sup-
port the restructuring of corporate groups.
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